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ARTICLES
INTRODUCING PROVISIONAL DAMAGES FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES IN CANADA
PAUL DUFAYSt

Where a plaintiff in a personal injury action can prove at trial that she has
suffered an injury that may be subject to future deterioration, Canadian
common law courts make a speculative assessment of any potential future
deterioration of the injury and decide damages once and for all. This provides
finality for the parties, but potentially at the cost of accurate compensation for
the plaintiff whose injuries later worsen. In 1985, the United Kingdom
introduced a regime of reviewable provisional damages for personal injury,
which allows review ofdamage awards after trial, improving compensation for
the plaintiff without creating indefinite uncertainty for the defendant. This
article examines this British reform, including its advantages and
disadvantages, and the author concludes it should be adopted in Canadian
common law jurisdictions.
Dans les provinces de common law au Canada, lorsque le demandeur reussit,
lors d'une action en responsabilite civile, a demontrer qu 'il a souffert des
dommages corporels, Les cours de justice doivent evaluer le prejudice prospectif
et doivent accorder des dommages et interets difinitifi. Accorder des
dommages difinitifi selon une evaluation du prejudice prospectif offie une
certaine finalite au litige entre les parties. En revanche, cette methode
d'accorder des dommages et interets risque de s'averer prejudiciel pour le
demandeur lorsque les dommages corporels actuels, se realisant suivant le
jugement, sont superieurs aux dommages corporels propectifi tels qu 'evalues
par la cour. La Grande-Bretagne a introduit une loi en 1985 qui reserve au
demandeur le droit de demander des dommages et interets additionels, si sa
condition se deteriore apres le jugement. Cela permet une compensation qui
reflete plus exactement le prejudice subit par le demandeur lorsque la
condition physique de celui-ci se deteriore apres jugement sans creer une
incertitude indifinie pour le defendeur. Cet article discute cette Loi anglaise
et ses avantages et desavantages, et conclut qu 'on do it !'adopter dans Les
provinces de common law au Canada.

t A.B. (Harvard), LLB. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie). The author would like to
thank Professor Tom Cromwell for his guidance in writing this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Often, a plaintiff in a personal injury action can prove some injury
resulted from the wrongful conduct of the defendant, but the full
extent of the resulting loss has not crystallized at the time of trial.
In these cases, Canadian common law courts, rather than waiting
for any future contingencies to occur, will make a speculative
assessment of the contingent damages at trial, and grant a lump
sum award. This principle is known as the "once and for all" rule.I
Its stated benefits are finality and certainty for the parties, their
insurers and the courts, and limitation of administrative
inconvenience and litigation costs.
In order to provide final judgments where a future contingent
loss exists, the common law in Canada has developed a
proportional damages rule. Where a plaintiff can establish on a
balance of probabilities that a risk of future loss has resulted from
the wrongful conduct of the defendant, even where the loss is
unlikely to occur, the court will estimate the amount of the
potential loss, and discount it pro rata, based on the quantified
possibility that the particular loss will occur. 2 Such an award of
proportional damages is thought to provide the best measure of the
potential loss of the plaintiff that is possible given the requirement
that the court determine the award of damages at trial while the
actual value of the loss, or whether it will occur at all, remains
unknown.
The principle of awarding proportional damages based on
speculation about the future state of a plaintiffs injury is deficient
from the point of view of providing compensation to the plaintiff to
put her in the position she would have been in had the wrong not
occurred. If the plaintiff's injury does not worsen, or a future
contingency does not occur, the award of proportional damages is a
windfall. The plaintiff is overcompensated. If, on the other hand,
the injury does worsen, or the future contingency is realized, the
plaintiff is under compensated. The award for the injury will be
significantly less than the actual financial loss it causes. The only
thing that is certain about the award is that it will always provide

1

Shrumpv. Koot(l977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 553 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Shrump];
Graham v. Rourke (1990), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Graham].
2 See Shrump, ibid.; Graham, ibid.
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inaccurate compensation for the loss, regardless of whether the
contingency occurs or not. 3
Britain has introduced a procedural rule that can produce more
perfect compensation where the loss resulting from a plaintiffs
injury is not known at trial. Legislative amendments passed in 1982
authorize changes to the Rules of the Supreme Court which allow a
plaintiff in a personal injury suit to apply for an award of provisional
damages. 4 If the plaintiff can show that her injury may deteriorate
in the future, she can ask the court for an award of damages at trial
that assumes the potential deterioration will not take place. Then, if
the injury does in fact deteriorate later, the plaintiff can apply to
the court to have damages reassessed based on this new
information.
It is submitted that Canadian common law jurisdictions can
considerably reduce speculation by the courts about the future
progress of personal injuries by copying this incremental British
reform. It would allow for better compensation: if an injury does
not worsen, the plaintiff does not receive a windfall. If the injury
does worsen, she can receive damages that closely match her actual
resulting loss. Although granting plaintiffs the right to apply for a
reassessment of their damages does increase administrative
inconvenience by allowing another proceeding, granting the right to
reassessment complies with the compensation principle which lies at
the very foundation of damages in tort. The cost and complexity of
reassessment need not increase inordinately, as the right to
provisional damages can be limited to those cases where certain
injuries exist and specific standards of proof can be met.5 Finality is
compromised to some degree, but the need for finality is based
more on faithfulness to the historically prevailing theory of
damages and a desire to avoid departure from precedent than an

3 G. Bale, "Encouraging the Hearse Horse Not to Snicker: A Tort Fund
Providing Variable Periodic Payments for Pecuniary Loss" in F. M. Steel and S.
Rogers-Magnet, eds., Issues in Tort Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) 91 at 117; J.
Fleming, "Damages: Capital or Rent?" (1969) 19 U.T.L.J. 295 at 303.
4 Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 1981, c. 54, s. 32A, as am. by Administration of
Justice Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 53, s. 6(1).
5 The British rules have been interpreted to allow provisional damages only
where the plaintiff can present proof of a possibility of deterioration beyond mere
speculation. See Hurditch v. Sheffield Health Authority, [1989] 2 All E.R. 869

(CA.).
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actual functional need. 6 The concept of revisiting awards is wellknown to family law in Canada, which appears to function without
bringing the courts to a halt. There appears to be little evidence that
allowing reassessment in a small number of personal injury cases
would create any insurmountable obstacle for the administration of
justice.
This article will examine the policy issues involved in awarding
provisional damages. It will review the present law in Canada
concerning lump sum awards for personal injury and the time and
methods of assessing future contingent losses, and will examine the
British reforms and how they have been received by the courts and
by litigants. It will review the reasons for and against modifying the
lump sum to allow future reassessment of damages. It will conclude
by suggesting how these reforms might be copied in Canada and
that such modifications to our rules might create more perfect
compensation for personal injury plaintiffs with only a modest
increase in administrative inconvenience.

II. POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY AWARDS OF
PROVISIONAL DAMAGES

The potential introduction of a system allowing awards of
provisional damages in Canada raises a number of policy issues. The
tension between better compensation for the plaintiff and
containing administrative costs and providing certainty and finality
for the parties and the courts lies at the heart of these issues. Any
provision allowing a later review of damages based on new evidence
about a personal injury will permit a more accurate award for the
plaintiff; one that will more closely compensate her for the actual
extent of her injuries. Any such provision will also require additional
later proceedings, increasing litigation costs for the parties,
increasing use of court time at public expense, and creating
uncertainty for defendants and their insurers. If we accept the
desirability of such a system, we must decide where to strike the
balance between these competing factors. Allowing review for a
broad set of circumstances will permit more opportunities to better
compensate personal injury plaintiffs, but will increase costs and

6

Bale, supra note 3 at 93-94.
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uncertainty. Limiting review to a narrow set of circumstances will
reduce costs and uncertainty, but will allow fewer opportunities to
properly compensate the plaintiff whose injuries deteriorate. There
are a number of parameters involved in such a system which can be
defined to be either more or less permissive of claims for provisional
damages. How we define them will determine the balance between
compensation and complexity that a system of provisional damages
will achieve.
1. Initial Injuries

Awards for provisional damages can be permitted for all personal
injuries, or can be limited to only those injuries which meet certain
criteria. It is possible to limit provisional damages to those plaintiffs
who can show either a probability or a possibility of future
deterioration in their injury. Another useful limit might be the type
of injury: it would reduce complexity to limit provisional damages
awards to traumatic injuries whose causation is clear and exclude
more systemic diseases or chronic diseases whose causes are unclear
or manifold. It might also be reasonable to limit provisional
damages, and the accompanying right to later review of damages,
to those cases where the potential future reassessment falls under a
financial cap.
2. Circumstances Leading to a Review

We could allow a review of damages subsequent to an initial
provisional award for any injury which develops that can be shown
to have been caused by the conduct for which the plaintiff was
originally found liable. On the other hand, it could be required to
specify the future deterioration which would allow review in the
initial award, and then only permit a subsequent application where
the specified deterioration can be shown. Where a review is allowed
for any deterioration caused by the defendant's tortious conduct, it
will most likely be necessary for the plaintiff to prove causation,
which may be contested by the defendant. Where a review is
limited to specified types of deterioration, any causation analysis
might be more limited, but could still be contested by the
defendant who argues that the deterioration specified had other
contributing causes exclusive of her conduct. It is also possible to
draft provisions which either permit or mandate a presumption that
a specified deterioration was caused by the original conduct of the

6
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defendant. Such a presumption would be rebuttable, but different
standards of proof for rebuttal might be possible. At first glance,
the review of provisional damages based on later deterioration
would seem to be limited to quantum only, but issues of causation
may be unavoidable on review.
3. Contingencies to be Considered on Review

The future deterioration of the plaintiff's injury is the primary
future contingency an award of provisional damages addresses, but
a later review of damages could take into account other
contingencies included in the initial award. The initial award will
often speculate as to future contingencies like the plaintiffs personal
employment prospects, the labour market in her industry, the
discount rate, the cost of future care, etc. If improving
compensation is the main goal of a system of provisional damages,
it could be argued that a later review of damages should take
societal contingencies like these into account along with any
deterioration of the plaintiff's injuries. Consideration of societal
contingencies, however, may be undesirable for practical reasons. It
is not unthinkable that every personal injury plaintiff, even those
whose condition will not reasonably deteriorate, would make a
claim for provisional damages so they would not lose the
opportunity of applying for a review in the event of a favourable
change in the discount rate or some other societal contingency.
4. Restrictions on Defendants

A reassessment of damages raises the likelihood that a defendant
may have to pay additional damages well after the initial award.
Most defendants will be insured, so the possibility the plaintiff's
judgment for additional damages will go unpaid is relatively small.
However, an uninsured defendant, although able to pay at the time
of the initial award, might be judgment-proof at the time of a
subsequent judgment following reassessment of damages. This
outcome would put the plaintiff in a worse position than if she had
received a lump-sum award in the same circumstances. Limiting
awards of provisional damages to insured defendants and
defendants who have comparable resources removes some choice
for the plaintiff, but precludes this possibility.
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5. Judicial Discretion and Applications for Provisional Damages
Awards of provisional damages can be based on a specific motion
by the plaintiff asking for provisional damages, where the trial
judge would have discretion to either grant or deny the application.
Alternatively, the application process could be eliminated, leaving
the decision as to whether to award provisional damages entirely up
to the judge. In contrast, the discretion of the judge can be
restricted, requiring applications for provisional damages to be
granted as a matter of course unless there are exceptional
circumstances.
6. Conclusion
Each of these parameters affects either the breadth of circumstances
in which provisional damages will be awarded, or, if they are
awarded, the scope and complexity of the application and
reassessment process. Collectively, they determine the balance
between increased compensation and increased costs and
uncertainty found in a system of provisional damages awards.
These parameters should be kept in mind when considering the
advantages and disadvantages of procedural changes to implement
provisional damages awards for personal injury claims.

III. THE PRESENT LAW IN CANADA
The main purpose of damages in tort is to further the principle of
restitutio in integrum: to put the plaintiff in the position he or she
would have been in if the wrong had not occurred.7 An often
quoted statement of this law is found in Livingstone v. Rawyards
Coal Co.:
I do not think that there is any difference of opinion as to
its being the general rule that, where any injury is to be
compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money
to be given for reparation of damages you should as
nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will
put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered,

7 Northern

Meat Packersv. Roynat Ltd. (1985), 63 N.B.R. (2d) 241 (Q.B.). See
also Dodd Properties Ltd. v. Canterbury City Council, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433 at 456,
(C.A.) Donaldson L.J ..
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in the same position as he would have been in if he had
not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his
compensation of reparation. 8

Canadian courts have developed significant case law to put this
principle into effect. Apart from the general principles of causation
and certainty, three specific principles of Canadian law are relevant
to the introduction of provisional damage awards for personal
injury: the rule requiring lump sum awards, the rule requiring
assessment of damages at trial once and for all, and the rule
granting proportionally discounted awards for future contingent
harm which might possibly result from the wrong.
Damages for personal injury, like all other tort damages, are
awarded at trial in a lump sum. In 1978, in a set of decisions that
have become known as the Damages Trilogy, 9 the Supreme Court
of Canada firmly established the requirement of granting tort
damages for personal injury in an aggregate lump sum award
including separately calculated heads of damages for various
components of the award. In 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the practice of granting lump sum damages for personal
injury, specifically rejecting an award of periodic payments which
had been granted to a plaintiff by the Manitoba Court of Appeal. Io
In some cases, the harm resulting from the defendant's
wrongful act may not be known at the time of trial, as it depends
on the outcome of some future contingency. Where this is the case,
the damages for the injury must be assessed once and for all at the
time of trial, even if this requires speculation as to certain future
events. I 1 This principle applies regardless of whether the future

8

(1880), 5 App. Cas. 25 at 39 (H.L.(Sc.)).
Andrews v. Grand and Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 83 D.L.R. (3d)
452 [hereinafter Andrews cited to D.L.R.]; Thornton v. Board of School Trustees
(Prince George), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267; Teno v. Arnold, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 83
D.L.R. (3d) 609.
IO Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750, 61 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [hereinafter
Watkins cited to D.L.R.].
I I Shrump, supra note 1; Graham, supra note 1. There remains some discretion in
an appellate court to accept new evidence in the assessment of damages for personal
injury at the time of appeal where circumstances are appropriate. See Kenny v. Ross
E. judge Transport Ltd. (1970), 14 (D.L.R.) (3d) 381 (N.B.C.A.); Cory v. Marsh
(1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 248 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1993), 80 B.C.L.R. (2d)
9
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contingency is one which might become known (e.g. if the range of
motion in an injured hand recovers fully or partially) or whether it
can never be known (e.g. if the plaintiff would have received a
future promotion but for an injury). 12
Where assessment of a loss based on such a future contingency
is required, the courts have adopted a proportional damages
approach. If the plaintiff can prove on a balance of probabilities that
the defendant's wrongful act caused some risk of future loss, the
courts will grant damages for the potential loss, discounting the
award to reflect the chance the loss will not occur. 13 For example, if
a plaintiff can prove that the conduct of the defendant has injured
her back, and the court finds that there is a forty percent chance the
injury will worsen requiring surgery, the court will award forty
percent of the total financial loss which would occur if the plaintiffs
injury worsens. 14
Although the proportional methodology used in calculating
such awards is the same whether the future event is theoretically
knowable or unknowable, there is some confusion over where the
xxvi (S.C.C.); Christie (Guardian ad !item of) v. Insurance Corp. of British
Columbia (1993), 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) 370 (C.A.).
12
A very limited exception to this principle is found in the Courts ofJustice Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, s. 116, responding to the recommendation of the Holland
Report (which responded to Dickson J.'s comments on the need for reform in
Andrews, supra note 9). This legislation provides for the later review of a lump sum
award of damages or even an award of periodic payment for personal injury, but
only where all the parties consent. Not surprisingly, this provision has not been
used. In its Report on Compensation far Personal Injuries and Death (1987), the
Ontario Law Reform Commission wrote (at 177, from dissenting opinion of H.
Allan Leal.):
Although it is too early at this stage to pass final judgment on the
ameliorative effect of [s. 129], since serious injuries involved in
most current cases were suffered prior to 1984, it is an educated
guess that the section will prove to be a dead letter because its
application expressly requires the consent of all affected parties.
Disagreement is the stuff of litigation and it would appear to be
asking too much that its terminal process be made the subject of
unanimity.
13

Shrump, supra note l; Graham, supra note 1. See also ]aniakv. Ippolito (1981),
18 CC.LT. 39 (Ont. C.A.).
14 Although provincial health insurance systems will generally cover most, if not
all, of the cost of such surgery, a period of convalescence following surgery can
create significant collateral costs for an injured plaintiff: lost wages or business
income, extra child care expenses for dependents, travel costs, etc.

10
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line between causation and certainty is being drawn in these two
cases. The two cases are different in the theoretical interaction
between causation and certainty (or causation and quantum). It is
important to explain the difference at this point to provide a
background for the discussion of provisional damages below. Cases
involving personal injuries that may worsen in the future can be
differentiated from the "loss of chance" cases 15 because a future
contingent injury, although unknown at the time of trial, is
knowable in theory, and damages are awarded for the possibility
that a future loss may actually occur. This is unlike the "loss of
chance" cases, where the wrongful conduct of the defendant has
deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to do something whose
eventual occurrence is now impossible and unknowable. In "loss of
chance" cases, damages are awarded for the loss of the chance: not
for what may happen, but rather for what might have been.
As discussed above, the "once and for all" principle results in
speculation by the courts whenever a plaintiff may suffer a loss in
the future as a result of an injury, and this loss is theoretically
knowable, but not known at the time of trial. Contrary to the
prevailing principle of compensation in damage awards, such
speculation will always fail to properly compensate the plaintiff.
How can the situation be improved? The law in these areas is well
settled, and the courts have been hesitant to change it, even though
they acknowledge its deficiencies. The Supreme Court of Canada
in Watkins wrote that:
The imperfections of a lump-sum, once-and-for-all
award, as a means of providing for a plaintiff's cost of
future care, have often been noted ....
The issue here is whether, in the absence of enabling
legislation or the consent of all parties, a court can or
should order that a plaintiff forgo his traditional right to
a lump-sum judgment for a series of periodic payments.
It is argued that the jurisprudence precludes a court from
ordering periodic payments adjusted to future needs.
The plaintiff, it is submitted, is entitled to receive his

!5 E.g. Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] K.B. 786 (C.A.); Poseidon Ltdv. Adelaide
Petroleum NL (1994), A.L.J.R. 313 (Aust. H.C.).
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future-care award as a lump sum; this fundamental
principle of tort law cannot be changed by a court, but
only by the legislature ....
Generally speaking, the judiciary is bound to apply the
rules of law found in the legislation and in the
precedents. Over time, the law in any given area may
change; but the process of change is a slow and
incremental one, based largely on the mechanism of
extending an existing principle to new circumstances.
While it may be that some judges are more activist than
others, the courts have generally declined to introduce
major and far-reaching changes in the rules hitherto
accepted as governing the situation before them.16

In Andrews, Dickson J. remarked that:
The subject of damages for personal injury is an area of
the law which cries out for legislative reform. The
expenditure of time and money in the determination of
fault is prodigal. The disparity resulting from lack of
provision for victims who cannot establish fault must be
disturbing. When it is determined that compensation is
to be made, it is highly irrational to be tied to a lumpsum system and a once-and-for-all award.
The lump-sum award presents problems of great
importance. It is subject to inflation, it is subject to
fluctuation on investment, income from it is subject to
tax. After judgment new needs of the plaintiff arise and
present needs are extinguished; yet, our law of damages
knows nothing of periodic payment....
The apparent reliability of assessments provided by
modern actuarial practice is largely illusionary, for
actuarial science deals with probabilities, not
actualities .... It cannot, and does not purport to, speak
as to the individual sufferer. So long as we are tied to
lump-sum awards, however, we are tied also to actuarial
calculations as the best available means of determining
amount.

l6

Supra note 10 at 580, 582, 583.
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In spite of these severe difficulties with the present law of
personal injury compensation the positive administrative
machinery required for a system of reviewable periodic
payments, and the need to hear all interested parties in
order to fashion a more enlightened system, both dictate
that the appropriate body to act must be the Legislature,
rather than the Courts. Until such time as the Legislature
acts, the Courts must proceed on established principles to
award damages which compensate accident victims with
justice and humanity for the losses they may suffer. 17
The problems inherent in the present lump-sum awards system, in
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, are best solved
through legislative reform. The solution may be, as the courts and
many academics have commented, the introduction of a power in
the courts to grant periodic payments. Or, as this paper will argue,
the solution may be the option for the courts to grant reviewable
provisional damages for personal injury.
IV. THE REFORM IN QUEBEC

The only jurisdiction in Canada which presently offers courts the
option of granting provisional damages for personal injury is
Quebec. Article 1615 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides that:
Article 1615. The court, in awarding damages for bodily
injury, may, for a period of not over three years, reserve
the right of the creditor to apply for additional damages,
if the course of his physical condition cannot be
determined with sufficient precision at the time of the
judgment.
This provision came into force January l, 1994. Note that
"creditor" in the civil law of Quebec means a judgment creditor, in
the sense of a successful plaintiff who has already had liability
found against the defendant.
In general, this provision gives the trial judge the discretion, in
addition to awarding damages for personal injury, to provide that
the successful plaintiff has the right to apply for an increase of those
damages within three years should the injury worsen. Such an

17

Andrews, supra note 9 at 458-59.
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award requires that it be impossible to predict with precision the
future condition of the victim. Given that the plaintiff who is
granted this right may receive an increase in damages later, the
judge will likely award more limited damages at trial than would
otherwise be awarded.
Baudoin points out that the three-year limitation in this
provision is the same as the general limitation on civil actions in
Quebec found in Article 2925 of the Civil Code of Quebec. He
suggests that three years will generally be long enough to assist
most plaintiffs who suffer serious deterioration, but not so long so
as to create an indefinite uncertainty for the defendant who may be
required to pay additional damages later. 18 A plaintiff who applies
for a later increase in damages must prove that a deterioration has
occurred or is now likely to occur, according to the generally
applicable requirements of proof for personal injury suits in
Quebec. 19
As Article 1615 is a relatively recent addition to the Civil Code
of Quebec, it has not been extensively considered by the courts.
Requests for the right to apply for a later increase in damages for
personal injury have been denied where the court held the injury
was not susceptible to further deterioration,20 and where the injury
suffered by the plaintiff has been stable for a significant period of
time. 21 In one case, 22 a plaintiff who brought an action against her
dentist for negligently performed dental work made a request
under Article 1615 for the right to apply for a later increase in
damages. Her argument was that the significant amount of metal
work that had been installed in her jaw prevented x-rays from
properly assessing the damaged caused by her dentist's negligence
and that the full extent of the physical harm might not be known
until later. The court held, in obiter dicta, that this was a perfect

J.-L. Baudoin, La Responsabilite Civile, 4th ed. (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1994)
at 166.
19 Ibid at 166-7.
20 Gagnon c. Laurendeau, [1996] A.Q. No. 3452 (Que. S.C.) (QL).
21 Poulin c. Prat, [1995] A.Q. No. 1665 (Que. S.C.) (QL).
22 Sauvageau c. Lussier, [1996] A.Q. No. 761 (Que. S.C.) (QL). See also Gaudetc.
Lagace, [1994] R. de responsabilite et assurance 532 (Que. S.C.), where a request
under Article 1615 was denied by the court on the grounds that any compensation
required by later deterioration of the plaintiff's injury was accounted for under the
head of damages known as "deficit anatomophysiologique."
18
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example of a case where Article 1615 should be applied. However,
the plaintiff had brought her action prior to the coming into force
of Article 1615, and it could not be applied retroactively. Her
request in respect of Article 1615 was therefore denied. On the
whole, the reported decisions available at this time do not paint a
clear picture of how this provision will be applied in the future.
Emulating Article 1615 of the Civil Code of Quebec in other
provinces would allow Canadian common law jurisdictions to allow
awards of provisional damages with a relatively minor legislative
amendment. However, considering the lack of judicial
consideration of this provision, as well as the potential hazards of
removing it from the civilian context of responsabilite civile and
transporting it into the common law of torts, this could create
substantial uncertainty. A system of provisional damages that has
been established in a common law jurisdiction elsewhere will likely
provide a more practical model for Canadian common law
jurisdictions than Article 1615 of the Civil Code of Quebec.
V. THE PROPOSED MODEL

A regime of reviewable provisional damages has been introduced in
Britain. It allows a plaintiff in a personal injury suit, where the
liability of the defendant has been proved or established, to apply
to the court for an award of provisional damages. The plaintiff is
required to prove that there is a chance that he, " ... as a result of
the act or omission which gave rise to the cause of action, [will]
develop some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration in
his physical or mental condition." 23 If this is proved, the plaintiff is
given an award of provisional damages which assumes that the
specified deterioration will not occur. If the condition or disease
then worsens in the future, the plaintiff has the right to apply for a
reassessment of damages based on new evidence of her condition. 24
The Supreme Court Rules were amended by the addition of

2 3 Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 1981, c. 54, s. 32A, as am. by Administration of
Justice Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 53, s. 6(1) [hereinafter Supreme Court Act]. In force
July 1, 1985.
24 Supreme CourtAct(U.K.), 1981, c. 54, s. 32A.
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procedures to be followed when an application for provisional
damages is made. 25
Prior to this reform, the common law in Britain with respect to
the assessment of personal injury damages was substantially similar
to the law in Canada. 26 The main purpose of damages in tort, as in
contract, is to return the injured person to the position she would
have been in if she had not sustained the wrong: restitutio in
integrum.27 Damages for personal injury in Britain are awarded in a
lump sum. 28 The plaintiff recovers for her loss once and for all in a
single action for past, present, and future losses, whether contingent
or certain. 2 9 At common law, the time for assessment of damages
was up to the commencement of the action, 30 although this has been
extended to the time of trial by the Supreme Court Rules.31 Where
an appeal is filed, the English Court of Appeal has given itself
discretion to hear evidence of events which occur up to the time of
the appeal. 32 Where a future contingent loss must be assessed at
trial, British courts will award the value of the potential loss times
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Order 37 Part II. See also Practice Note, [1985] 2 All E.R. 895.
Some differences exist, such as the use of the multiplier/multiplicand method
in Britain. However, insofar as those common law rules which are modified or
excepted from through the introduction of a provisional damages regime (lump
sum awards, once-and-for-all assessment and proportional damages for future
contingencies) are concerned, they remain substantially similar to the analogous
Canadian rules.
2 7 Livingstonev. Rawyards Coal Co., supra note 8 at 39 (H.L.); Phillipsv. London
and South Western Rly. Co. (1879), 5 C.P.D. 78 at 87 (C.A.); The Mediana, [1900]
A.C. 113 at 119 (H.L.).
28 See P. Cane, ed., Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 4th ed.
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987) at 150.
2 9 Jones v. Griffith, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1015 (C.A.); Darley Main Colliery Co. v.
Mitchell (1886), 11 App. Cas. 127 at 133 (H.L.), Lord Halsbury; Fitterv. Veal
(1701) 12 Mod. Rep. 542; 88 E.R. 1506,(sub nom. Fetterv. Beale) 1 Ld. Raym 692.
30 Brasfieldv. Lee (1697), 1 Ld. Raym 329; 91 E.R. 1115.
3! RSC Order XXXVI r 58. This has been applied in cases such as Holev. Chard
Union [1894] 1 Ch. 293 (C.A.) and]onesv. Simes (1890), 43 Ch.D. 607; 59 LJ. Ch.
351.
3 2 McCann v. Sheppard, [1973] 2 All E.R. 881; [1973] 1 WLR 540 (C.A.). In
Matthews v. Flora (1989), Times, 20 March (C.A.) Stocker]., May J., and Taylor
LJJ.), the Court of Appeal held that is was often helpful and useful for a plaintiff
who had suffered certain personal injuries to be present on appeal, in order that they
might be examined.
26
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the probability that this loss will occur. 33 There is a limited power to
award periodical payments for the cost of future care in a case of
personal injury, but only with the consent of both parties.34
Provisional damages were first officially proposed in Britain in
1971. In a working paper, the u.K. Law Commission proposed both
a system of periodic payments for tort compensation35 and a
system of provisional damages. 36 After consultation, the Law
Commission concluded in its Report on Personal Injury LitigationAssessment of Damages that, while the introduction of a system of
periodic payments was at that time unworkable, 37 the courts should
be given the power to make awards of provisional damages.3 8
In this report, the Commission noted the difficulty in making
speculative compensation for uncertain future losses. It divided such
losses into two categories, "chance" cases and "forecast" cases. It
defined "chance" cases as those where an estimate is made of the
probability of some future loss occurring, and an award is given
based on the amount of the loss and the exact probability that it
will occur. The Commission noted that awards in "chance" cases
would always under compensate or overcompensate the plaintiff. It
defined "forecast" cases as those where the estimate made is one of
a medical condition deteriorating to a certain degree within a
certain period of time, causing a particular degree of loss, as
opposed to the speculation over whether a future contingency
would occur at all. The Commission said that because "forecast"
cases did not involve an all-or-nothing speculation about an event,
but rather a speculation as to degree, it was theoretically possible for
the estimate in a "forecast" case to be exactly correct. 39
The Commission recommended that the courts be given the
power to award provisional damages. This reform was aimed at
improving the compensation awarded in "chance" cases where the

33 Chaplin v. Hicks, supra note 15.
34

Burke v. Tower Hamlets Health Authority (1989), Times, 10 August (Q.B.).
U.K., Law Commission, Published Working Paper No. 41 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1971) at paras. 226-52.
36 Ibid at paras. 254-56.
37 U.K., Law Commission, Report on Personal Injury Litigation-Assessment of
Damages (Law Com. 56) (London: H.M.S.O., 1973) at paras. 26-30.
3 8 Ibid at paras. 231-44.
39 The same distinction was made by Lord Diplock in Mallettv. McMonagle,
[1970] AC. 166 (H.L.).
35
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amount awarded was necessarily inaccurate. The system the
Commission suggested allowed the courts, upon application by the
plaintiff, to award damages without speculation as to the future
progress of the plaintiffs injuries. As part of the granting of such an
award, the plaintiff would have the right to apply for a future
reassessment of damages within a period of time specified in the
initial award. In order to eliminate uncertainty about a defendant's
ability to pay any future award, the Commission recommended
that awards of provisional damages should only be made against
public authorities, insured defendants, and certain defendants
exempt from motor vehicle requirements under highway traffic
statutes. 40 The Commission noted that since this change departed
from the established principles of damage compensation, it should
be implemented through legislation and presumably amendments
to the Rules of Court, supplemented by a practice direction.
These recommendations were repeated in 1978 by the Pearson
Commission, although in a slightly different form and under a
different name. 41 This Commission recommended "declaratory
judgments,'' which entailed essentially the same procedure as the
1973 report had for provisional damages. A plaintiff who was
suffering from "a serious and lasting injury which is not, at the time
of the trial, causing him pecuniary loss" could apply for a
declaratory judgment. This judgment would define the relevant
injury and any contributory negligence, if applicable. If the injury
later worsened causing pecuniary loss, the plaintiff could apply for a
review of her original award. The Pearson Commission
recommended that these declaratory judgments be restricted to the
same classes of defendants specified in the 1973 report. It expressed
the opinion that since only a few tort claims are made against
individuals, this restriction would apply only rarely. The Pearson
Commission also recommended that while such orders would be
made by the High Court, they should be reviewed by a Master or

40 Mallettv. McMonagle, [1970] A.C. 166 (H.L.) at para 240. The third class of
defendant subject to provisional damage awards was " ... (c) in road accident cases [a
defendant] exempt from the requirements as to insurance of section 143 of the Road
Traffic Act 1972 (U.K.) by reason of his making a deposit with the Accountant
General of the Supreme Court or otherwise."
4l U.K., Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, Report, vol. 1 (London, 1978) (Chair: Lord Pearson) at 127, paras. 584-5
[hereinafrer Pearson Commission].
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the equivalent office. It should be noted that this recommendation
was made in the context of recommending a system of periodic
payment awards requiring regular review of which the declaratory
judgments were an additional feature.
In 1982, the u.K. Parliament passed the Administration ofJustice
Act 1982 (u.K.), of which section 6 amended the Supreme Court
Act. Section 32A, the new section of the Supreme Court Act,
provides in part:
32A.-(l) This section applies to an action for damages
for personal injuries in which there is proved or admitted
to be a chance that at some definite or indefinite time in
the future the injured person will, as a result of the act or
omission which gave rise to the cause of action, develop
some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration
in his physical or mental condition.
(2) Subject to subsection (4) below, as regards any action
for damages to which this section applies in which a
judgment is given in the High Court, provision may be
made by rules of court for enabling the court, in such
circumstances as may be prescribed, to award the injured
person
(a) damages assessed on the assumption that the
injured person will not develop the disease or suffer the
deterioration in his condition; and
(b) further damages at a future date if he develops
the disease or suffers the deterioration. 42

Other parts of the amendment create the power to make rules
incidental to the function of awarding provisional damages, 43 but
limit the interpretation of section 32A, specifying that it shall not
be read as affecting any power to make costs or to reduce or limit
the total damages recoverable in an action. 44 The amendment also
applies by reference to the U.K. county courts. 45 It came into force

42 Supreme

CourtAct(U.K.), 1981, c. 54, s. 32A(l)(2).
Supreme CourtAct(U.K.), 1981, c. 54, s. 32A(3).
44 Supreme CourtAct(U.K.), 1981, c. 54, s. 32A(4).
45 Administration ofjustice Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 53, s. 6(3).
43
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July 1, 1985, and applies to all causes of action determined after
this date, even if arising earlier. 46
The Rules of the Supreme Court have been amended to create a
procedure to be followed in making provisional damages awards.
Order 37, Part II of the Rules provides in part:
Order for provisional damages
8.-(1) The Court may on such terms as it thinks just
and subject to the provisions of this rule make an award
of provisional damages if
(a) the plaintiff has pleaded a claim for provisional
damages, and
(b) the Court is satisfied that the action is one
which section 32A applies.

to

(2) An order for an award of provisional damages shall
specify the disease or type of deterioration in respect of
which an application may be made at a future date, and
shall also, unless the Court otherwise determines, specify
the period within which such application may be made.
(3) The Court may, on the application of the plaintiff
made within the period, if any specified in paragraph (2),
by order extend that period if it thinks it just to do so,
and the plaintiff may make more than one application.
(4) And order for an award of provisional damages may
be made in respect of more than one disease or type of
deterioration and may in respect of each disease or
deterioration specify a different period within which an
application may be made at a future date.
Offer to submit to an award
9.-(1) Where an application is made for an award of
provisional damages, any defendant may at any time

46

A. Samuels, "Provisional Damages" (1987) 131 Sol. Jo. 187.
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(whether or not he makes a payment into court) make a
written offer to the plaintiff
(a) to tender a sum of money (which may include an
amount, to be specified, in respect of interest) in
satisfaction of the plaintiffs claim for damages assessed
on the assumption that the injured person will not
develop the disease or suffer the deterioration referred to
in section 32A [(a) and identifying the disease or
deterioration in question]; and
(b) to agree to the making of an award of provisional
damages.
(2) Any offer under paragraph (1), shall not be brought
to the attention of the Court until after the Court has
determined the claim for an award of provisional
damages.
(3) Where an offer is made under paragraph (1), the
plaintiff may, within 21 days after receipt of the offer,
give written notice to the defendant of his acceptance of
the offer and shall on such acceptance make an
application to the Court for an order in accordance with
the provisions of rule 8(2).
Application for award of further damages
10.-(1) This rule applies where the plaintiff, pursuant to
an award of provisional damages, claims further
damages.
(2) No application for further damages may be made
after the expiration of the period, if any, specified under
rule 8(2), or of such period as extended under rule 8(3).
(3) The plaintiff shall give not less than three months'
written notice to the defendant of his intention to apply
for further damages and, if the defendant is to the
plaintiffs knowledge insured in respect of the plaintiffs
claim, to the insurers ....
(6) Only one application for further damages may be
made in respect of each disease or type of deterioration
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specified in the order for the award of provisional
damages.47

These Rules have been supplemented by a Practice Direction. 48 It
reiterates the requirement that an order for provisional damages
specify the disease or type of deterioration that has been assumed
will not occur, and provides that the judge will normally specify the
period within which an application for further damages must be
made. It specifies the form of and order for provisional damages. It
also sets out a procedure for the creation of a case file including the
order, pleadings, and all medical evidence that must be filed and
stored at the Court in expectation of an application for further
damages. Such a case file must be made not only where provisional
damages are awarded at trial, but also where a settlement is reached
as to an initial amount, but the plaintiff retains the right to apply
for further damages. Another Practice Direction addresses the
procedure to be followed in a claim where provisional damages are
pled and the defendant defaults in either giving notice of intention
to defend or in serving the defence.49
This statutory reform, supplemented by amendments to the
Rules and by Practice Directions, has created an exception to the
"once and for all" principle of assessing all personal injury damages
at trial. The plaintiff must plead provisional damages specifically,
and if this is granted, the resulting order is final as to immediate
damages. The order assumes that a specified condition or disease
will not develop or deteriorate. The plaintiff has the right, within a
specified time period, and with respect to only the disease or
condition specified, to apply for an award of further damages if the
disease or condition appears or deteriorates. The plaintiff must
prove a "chance" that their condition may deteriorate in the future
and the deterioration must be "serious."
Note that Parliament did not enact the restriction suggested in
the 1973 Law Commission report that only insured and
comparably financially stable defendants should be subject to
awards of provisional damages. This makes some sense. The

470rder 37, Part II,
48 [1985] 2 All E.R.

Rule 8-10.
895. This has been amended by [1995] 1 W.L.R. 507, which
applies most of the 1985 direction to any appeals of provisional damages to the
Court of Appeal, mutatis mutandis.
49 [1988] 1 W.L.R. 654.
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restriction would not have made a difference in the great majority
of cases. If the defendant is presently judgment-proof, and
presents no reasonable possibility of ever being able to pay damages,
then the plaintiff is in the same position regardless of whether she
pleads provisional damages or an unreviewable lump sum. She will
not be able to recover at all. A restriction on defendants might
apply here, but practically serves no purpose in these circumstances.
Similarly, if the defendant is financially stable and can reasonably
be expected to pay present and future damages (e.g. an insured
defendant), the plaintiff can choose to plead provisional damages if
it makes sense to do so given the nature of her injuries, and need
not consider the ability of the defendant to pay. The restriction
would not apply here. The only situation where this restriction
would effectively operate is where a plaintiff who can reasonably
plead provisional damages brings a claim against a defendant who
appears presently able to pay, but may not be able to pay a future
award of damages. A plaintiff who was awarded provisional
damages against such a defendant might suffer for doing so, as the
provisional award would presumably be less than the unreviewable
lump sum would otherwise have been; and the plaintiff, while
having the legal right to apply for further damages, might not be
able to collect the resulting judgment. But this eventuality does not
necessarily justify a restriction on defendants who are likely to pay.
Under the British Rules, the plaintiff has the choice of whether or
not to plead provisional damages. She is in at least as good a
position as the court to determine whether the defendant may not
be able to pay an award of further damages. If she were making a
claim against a risky defendant, she could assess the risk of the
defendant's future inability to pay, and decide whether or not to
apply for provisional damages or a conventional lump sum
accordingly. If the purpose of the restriction is to protect the
plaintiff from not being able to collect, it would appear that she is
at least as able to protect herself as an inflexible statutory restriction
could.
VI. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION
Subsequent judicial consideration of the provisions has revealed and
to some extent clarified certain ambiguities in the original drafting
of the statute.
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1. A Chance
In Mann v. Merton & Sutton Health Authority,5° the trial judge
noted that "chance" was an unusual statutory word. Another
interpretation of "chance" in s. 32A of the Supreme Court Act 1981
(u.K.) has echoed this opinion, and has given more certain meaning
to the term. In Patterson v. Ministry of Defence, 51 Brown]. held that
"chance" included a possibility that was not so insubstantial and so
negligible as not to qualify as a chance at all. While he had strong
reservations about risks well below one percent, a two percent risk
was considered enough.
In Willson v. Ministry of Defence, 52 the plaintiff, a naval
dockyard fitter, injured his ankle at work. The injury left him with
continuing disability and pain. Medical evidence suggested that
there would be degeneration in the ankle, that the plaintiff would
remain prone to injuries in the future, and that there was a
possibility of him developing arthritis. The plaintiff brought a claim
for provisional damages against his former employers. He argued
that he would be entitled to a future award of damages if he
developed arthritis to the point that he required surgery. The court
held that "chance" in the context of section 32A of the Supreme
Court Act 1981 (u.K.) had to be a possibility that was measurable
rather than fanciful.
Richard Bragg has commented that "in reality, judges have
found that, provided there is some risk, it is helpful that they do
not actually have to decide between competing medical claims as to
its degree. "53
2. Serious Disease or Serious Deterioration
Perhaps the leading case in interpreting the meaning of "serious" in
section 32A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (u.K.) is Willson. The
potential deterioration at issue here was the normal progressive
deterioration of arthritis. Baker ]. wrote that "the courts have not
yet worked out the precise circumstances in which awards for

50 (1989) [unreported] cited in R. Bragg, "Provisional Damages" (1992) 136 Sol.
Jo. 654 at 654 [hereinafter Mann].
51 [1987] C.L.Y. 1194.
52 [1991] 1 All E.R. 638 [hereinafter Willson].
53 Bragg, supra note 50 at 654.
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provisional damages will be made. "5 4 He held that serious
deterioration in the meaning of the Supreme Court Act was not only
a clear and severable risk as opposed to a gradual deterioration, but
a deterioration that was beyond the expected norm. The normal
progressive deterioration of arthritis did not qualify as a serious
deterioration and the plaintiff was awarded damages in a
conventional lump sum. Normal deterioration such as was involved
in this case can and should be taken into account in a lump sum
award.
This decision seems to make implicitly the same distinction
between the "chance" and "forecast" cases as was made the Law
Commission's report in 1973. The clear and severable risk is
analogous to the "chance" cases, where future speculation is
required as to a discrete future event which will either occur or not
occur. Proportional damages awarded on the basis of this
speculation will always either under compensate or overcompensate
the plaintiff. Similarly, normal deterioration is analogous to the
"forecast" cases where speculation is made as to the degree of future
deterioration and this speculation has a chance, in theory, of being
more or less correct. In light of the fact that the Law Commission
suggested provisional damages to remedy the "chance" cases and
not the "forecast" cases, Willson is faithful to the original purposes
of the Law Commission, as it restricts provisional damages to the
clear and severable risk cases, excluding cases of progressive
deterioration. This makes good sense, as progressive deterioration
and any speculation as to the degree of such deterioration can be
addressed by the methods used in a conventional lump-sum award.
Provisional damages awards offer no special advantage in
addressing these cases.
In Cripps v. Bowden,55 the court refused an order for provisional
damages where the risk at issue was premature degeneration of the
knee, because the type of deterioration in question could be
prevented by corrective surgery.56
In response to the ambiguity in the Act about the meaning of
the word "serious" in the applicable provisions, the Law

Willson, supra note 52 at 641.
(1986) [unreported], cited in Bragg, supra note 50 at 654 [hereinafter Cripps].
56See also Cronin v. London Borough ofRedbridge (1987), 137 N.L.J. 637 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Cronin].
54

55
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Commission in 1992 made a provisional recommendation
endorsing the view of Baker J. in Willson that provisional damages
should not extend to the gradual deterioration of an injury.57
This interpretation of the statutory provisions and rules of court
that authorize provisional damages in Britain has restricted the set
of circumstances which give the plaintiff the right to apply for a
reassessment of damages subsequent to an initial provisional award.
This restriction raises the issue of whether causation has been
determined finally in the initial award and any reassessment will
only concern itself with the issue of quantum, or whether causation
remains a material issue in the reassessment. Certainly, the
restrictive interpretation precludes many possible causation
arguments in a reassessment proceeding, as it is not open to the
plaintiff to argue that any deterioration other than the one(s)
specified in the initial award was caused by the defendant, nor is it
open to the plaintiff to argue causation with respect to even a
specified deterioration that is only gradual. However, this does not
necessarily mean examination of causation in the reassessment
proceeding has been precluded entirely. Where the plaintiff applies
for reassessment on the basis that she has suffered a deterioration
that is both specified in the initial award and sufficiently marked
and distinct, it would appear to still be open to the defendant to
argue that this deterioration was not in fact caused by her conduct.
Although such arguments might be rare, a defendant in certain
circumstances might be able to argue that the deterioration in
question was in fact due to a cause that is independent of the
wrongful conduct on which the original action was based.
3. Interaction with Fatal Accidents Act 1976

Section 1 (I) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (u.K.) provides that:
1.-(1) If death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or
default which is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the person injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who
would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be

57 U.K., Law Commission, Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional
Damages: A Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper No. 125) (London: H.M.S.O.,
1992) at 76.
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liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured.5 8

This provision has been interpreted to mean that the right to make
a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act is lost if the deceased made
any claim for the same injury while alive and that claim was settled
or gone to judgment.59 If a plaintiff in a personal injmy action is
granted an award of provisional damages and then dies from the
injury specified in the order, it is unclear whether the initial award is
considered a claim "gone to judgment" which operates to preclude
her dependents from bringing a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act.
The u.K. Law Commission argues that " ... it cannot be said that
the immediate award of provisional damages determines once and
for all the rights of the parties. "60 Because other provisions6 1
specifically exclude any damages for income in the lost years from
any surviving cause of action that vests in the estate of the deceased,
if the dependents are also precluded from making a claim under
the Fatal Accidents Act regime, compensation for the lost years may
be denied entirely. In contrast, a lump sum award made in the
same circumstances , would likely be able to take into account the
possibility the plaintiff might die from her injuries.
This issue arose in Middleton v. Elliott Turbomachinery Ltd. 62
The Court of Appeal considered whether a previous award of
provisional damages by a deceased person prevented her
dependents from making a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act, but
because this was not at issue between the parties, it declined to
express a view, and the law remains uncertain on this point.
This case also raised the related issue of whether the estate of a
plaintiff who was awarded provisional damages and then dies from
the injury or condition specified in the award is precluded from
claiming earnings for the lost years, as required by the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, or if a situation involving provisional

58

FatalAccidentsAct1976(u.K.), 1976, c.30 [hereinafter FatalAccidentsAct]

59 Readv. The Great Eastern Railway Co. (1868), LR. 3 Q.B. 555.
U.K., Law Commission (1992, No. 125), supra note 57 at 83.
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (U.K.), 1934, c. 41, ss. 1(1),(2)
as am. by Administration ofjustice Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 53, s. 4(2) [hereinafter
Law Reform Act].
62 (1990) The Times, October 29; The Independent, November 16 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Middleton].
60
61

INTRODUCING PROVISIONAL DAMAGES

27

damages is treated differently. The Court of Appeal, in obiter dicta,
suggested that in such a situation the estate would be able to claim
earnings for the lost years.
In response to this ambiguity, the U.K. Law Commission
recommended in a 1994 Command Paper the enactment of a
statutory provision which specifies:
Where a person who has been awarded provisional
damages later dies because of the act which caused the
injury for which damages were awarded, the damages
awarded shall not bar an action relating to the death
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976; but any of the
damages intended to compensate for future pecuniary
loss shall be taken into account by the court when
assessing any loss in relation to any dependency claim
brought under the Fatal Accidents Act, where it is just to
do so. 63

4. Agreement as to Settlement of Initial Claim
Rule 9 of Order 37, Part Il 64 creates a procedure whereby a plaintiff
who has applied for provisional damages can reach what is
essentially a provisional settlement with the defendant. The
defendant offers a sum of money in satisfaction of the plaintiffs
initial claim for provisional damages. If the plaintiff accepts, she
must apply for an award of provisional damages. If the court grants
the application, the parties will inform the judge of the amount of
the settlement. The court will then give judgment for provisional
damages in that amount. The order will specify the disease or
deterioration for which, if it occurs, the plaintiff will have the right
to apply for an award of further damages.
In Hurditch v. Sheffield Health Authority, 6 5 the plaintiff worker
had been exposed to asbestos in both his previous and his present
employment. When he developed asbestos-related health problems,
he brought an action against his present employers claiming
provisional damages. The employers made an offer in satisfaction

63

U.K., Law Commission, Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional
Damages: Item 11 of the Fifth Programme ofLaw Reform: Damages (Law Com. No.
224) Cmnd 2646 (London: HMSO, 1994) at 106.
64 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
65 [1989] 2 All E.R. 869 (C.A.).
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of the claim on October 20, 1986. It was accepted on November
12, 1986 (22 days later). The plaintiff applied for judgment
according to Order 37, Rule 9. The application included a medical
statement about the plaintiffs present condition and potential for
future deterioration. The defendants disputed part of the medical
statement and argued that their letter was not an offer to submit to
provisional damages. The trial judge held that there was no
agreement under Rule 9. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal
of the plaintiff. It held that all that was required to make an award
for provisional damages under section 32A of the Supreme Court
Act and the Rules were an offer, acceptance, the amount for an
award, and the specified disease or condition in respect of which
the award is to be made. The disagreement about the medical
statements was only over evidence of future deterioration, which
was held not to bear on a provisional award in respect of the
plaintiff's existing condition. An agreement for an award of
provisional damages was found under section 32A and Rule 9.

VII. COMMENTS BY PRACTITIONERS
Detailed academic commentary on the provisional damages regime
is hard to find, presumably because it is essentially a procedural
change and not a substantive one, and has therefore not attracted
the attention of academics. 66 However, shorter commentary from
publications for the practicing U.K. bar has revealed certain trends in
the application of the system by the courts and argues that there are
several shortcomings in the regime as enacted.
A 1987 article suggested that "[t]he defendant may be
expected normally to oppose provisional damages because of the
administrative work and expense of a second or deferred trial." 67
However, it points out that if the present injuries are relatively
limited, and the bulk of the claim lies in uncertain future
deterioration, a defendant might prefer to take her chances with a
provisional award of damages. It suggests that judges will exercise

66 Academic discussion in Canada of reforms to the lump sum award for personal
injury claims has focused strongly on periodic payment schemes or comprehensive
public tort funds, to the exclusion of reforms involving provisional damages that
can be later reassessed.
67 Samuels, supra note 46 at 187.
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their discretion not to award provisional damages in cases where
future deterioration is either highly likely or highly unlikely, as a
conventional lump sum is better suited to these situations.
Provisional damages were more likely to be awarded in cases where
the future deterioration might or might not happen. It suggests that
medical staff who prepare reports and give evidence should be
instructed to consider all possible future occurrences that might
arise out of the present injury and to distinguish between those and
the present condition of the plaintiff. Because a future award can
only be given if a specified type of deterioration occurs, the
plaintiffs counsel should try to encourage the judge to describe the
potential future deterioration as broadly as possible in the order. It
concludes by citing case law that establishes the professional duty of
lawyers to take proper advantage of new procedures such as this for
their clients. 68
A more recent article points out an intriguing case about the
specification of the conditions or diseases about which the
assumption is made in awarding provisional damages. 6 9 The claim
was for asbestos-related personal injuries. There was considerable
doubt on the part of medical experts as to whether certain
conditions should be specified in the award, as it was uncertain
whether they were actually caused by exposure to asbestos. The
judge decided to specify them in the award, reasoning that medical
knowledge would improve before the time of a subsequent hearing
and might well settle the issue by then. This article also examined
the practice of the courts with respect to setting time limits for
subsequent applications. In general, courts were hesitant to set short
periods, presumably because they did not want to deprive the
plaintiff of her right to future damages. Several cases were cited
where the judge had chosen not to specify at all. In one case, the
Court of Appeal lifted the twenty-year period imposed by the trial
judge and substituted an unlimited period.7° Another saw a limit
set of thirty years, which was deliberately beyond the life

68
69
70

SaifAliv. Sydney Mitchell, [1980] AC. 198.
Mann, supra note 50 at 654.
Middleton, supra note 62.
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expectancy of the plaintiff. 71 In another case, the court specified the
period for subsequent applications as the life time of the plaintiff.72
Whatever form a proposed amendment allowing awards of
provisional damages takes, it is best preceded by a thorough
examination of the advantages or disadvantages of modifying the
present system to allow reviewable damage awards.

VIII.

ADVANTAGES OF REFORM

1. Improved Compensation
The compensation principle is the mam principle of modern
damages assessment.7 3 The emphasis on compensation of the
Supreme Court of Canada in its leading decisions on personal
injury damages is clear. 74 The present system of lump sum awards,
once-and-for-all assessment at trial, and proportional damages for
future contingent losses provides poor compensation. This
shortcoming has been noted by many commentators.75 The
Osborne Report stated that "[t]he tort system's lump sum payment
necessarily requires a present prediction (which may well be wrong)
about future compensable losses." 76 John Fleming argues that:
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Mann, supra note 50.
Cronin, supra note 56.
73 K. Cooper-Stephenson, Personal Injury Damages in Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1996) at 108; B.M. McLachlin, "What Price Disability? A Perspective on
the Law of Damages for Personal Injury" (1981) 59 Can. Bar. Rev. 1at2-12.
74 Andrews, supra note 9; Watkins, supra note 10.
75 In a speech given after the Trilogy decisions were reported, Dickson J. (as he
then was) said,
72

It is plain that any global amount awarded may either be too
large or too small. The plaintiff may be in receipt of $1 million
or more. If he dies within a year or so, his family or strangers
will reap a windfall benefit. If on the other hand, the plaintiff
survives, it may well be that the fund is exhausted long before his
life's end.

See "The Role and Function ofJudges" (1979) 14 L.S.U.C. Gazette 138 at 149.
76 Hon. Justice C. Osborne, Report of Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident
Compensation in Ontario, Vol. 1 (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1988) at
456.
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assessing future losses calls for speculation about events
that the flux of time will render certain, such as ups and
downs in the victim's physical condition ....
As to these we are therefore invited, nay compelled, to
predict-more bluntly: to guess. The shortcomings of
the process are lamentable beyond imagination. It would
be bad enough if the choice were between guessing either
right or wrong: but our methods virtually assure that the
choice must turn out wrong. For the accredited approach
is to compromise, that is, neither to award the whole
amount nor yet to refuse all, but instead to assess and
award the value of the chance . .. .77
It is not therefore the case (as stated earlier) that once and-for-all awards may, but that (in the nature of things)
they must result either in under- or over-compensation of
the plaintiff. 78

Similarly, Gordon Bale argues that:
[I]f compensation is awarded for the "medical chance"
that, for instance, a head injury may result in epilepsy,
the compensation is bound to be wrong. If there is a 10%
probability that epilepsy may result from the injury and
if one awards 10% of the future loss of earnings should
epilepsy develop, no individual will be properly
compensated, In approximately 90% of the cases the
claimant will be over compensated and in approximately
10% of the cases the claimant will be ve1y seriously under
compensated. A lump sum system which compensates
for "medical chance" uncertainty is inevitably bound to
be wrong. 79

A system of provisional damages improves the compensation
provided by awards for personal injuries by eliminating speculation
about the future progress of the plaintiffs condition. The award
given is based on the assumption that the plaintiffs condition will
not deteriorate (or develop at all, in the epilepsy example). If the
condition does not actually deteriorate, no compensation is given

Fleming, supra note 3 at 302.
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Ibid at 303.
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Bale, supra note 3 at 117.
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for the deterioration. Conversely, if the condition does deteriorate
or develop, compensation will be given for the resulting loss, based
on a retrospective examination of evidence. In either case, the
compensation given is considerably more accurate than would be
given in a prospective, once-and-for-all lump sum.
Some explanation is required here of the change that using an
award of provisional damages makes to the interaction between
causation and certainty in determination of a subsequent award
upon reassessment. The use of a restriction on provisional damages
that limits reassessment to only those deteriorations that are
foreseeable at the time of the initial award and specified there (like
the British system), removes many opportunities for causation
analysis as part of a reassessment. It is not open to the plaintiff to
argue that the wrongful conduct of the defendant was the cause of
any deterioration that was not specified in the initial award even if
it was in fact caused by the defendant's conduct. However, it is still
open for the defendant to contest the assertion made in a review of
damages that her wrongful conduct was a necessary and
contributing cause of the deterioration specified. It is possible that
an initial award of provisional damages could specify a particular
foreseeable deterioration that could occur in the plaintiff, and that
this deterioration actually occurs, but is caused by factors
independent of the defendant's conduct. For example, a plaintiff
whose hand had been injured by the fault of the defendant could
receive an initial award of provisional damages which specified a
marked onset of arthritis in the hand as a basis for possible future
reassessment. If the plaintiff is aged and is particularly predisposed
to arthritis, it is possible she might develop arthritis in the hand of
the nature specified in the initial award, but that is caused by
factors unrelated to the injury caused by the defendant. In these
circumstances, it is not just to require the defendant to pay
damages for a loss which she did not cause and it should be open
for the defendant to contest causation. It appears then, that even
the narrow limits set in the British system do not eliminate
causation analysis completely from a subsequent reassessment of
provisional damages.
Given that causation analysis will still remain a part of a
subsequent reassessment of damages, what principles should apply
in determining causation with respect to the deterioration at issue,
considering the relationship between causation and certainty
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involved in calculating damages for personal injury? It is submitted
that the same principles used to determine damages for personal
injuries that are already known at the time of trial should be used
for a subsequent reassessment of provisional damages for personal
injury. These principles are (a) use of a but/for test to determine
necessary causes on a balance of probabilities; and (b) proof of
specific loss, also on a balance of probabilities. 80 After all, the
functional purpose of provisional damage awards paired with later
reassessment is to mimic a trial where the injures are known: to
allow, through the passage of time, the retrospective calculation of
damages for personal injuries as losses that are known and
specifically provable instead of requiring speculation about future
contingencies and proportional discounting of the award of
damages to reflect the approximate chance the contingency will not
occur.
This choice of principles can be demonstrated through the
discussion of three different types of circumstances. The first type
is past known events. Past known events are losses which have
manifested themselves prior to a proceeding. They can be
specifically proved. No speculation is required to calculated
damages related to past known events. Damages for past known
events are calculated, as above, using a but/for test to determine
necessary contributing causes on a balance of probabilities and proof
of specific loss, also on a balance of probabilities. The second case is
future contingent events or "actual future contingencies." These are
possible future events which may or may not occur, but if they do,
the cause will be the defendant's wrongful conduct. The
defendant's fault has created a risk that the event will occur in the
future. These are referred to here as actual future contingencies

80 Apportionment of damages based on fault between multiple necessary causes of
the injury is also one of the principles which should be included here, but it is
omitted from the text for the sal<e of clarity. In the context of the present discussion,
this apportionment of fault could be easily confused with the proportional damages
awarded for future knowable contingencies. This confusion should be avoided in all
circumstances, as these principles go to different aspects of damages analysis. The
apportionment of fault goes to the relative proportional contribution of multiple
causes which are each proved to be necessary causes on a balance of probabilities.
Proportional damages goes not to causation but rather to quantum: it is the
discounting of the amount of damages for a future contingent event which may or
may not occur whose causation is (generally) clear, if it actually does occur.
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because they may actually occur in the future. It is simply not
known at present if they will. "Causation" is sometimes a confusing
term when used in reference to actual future contingencies, as it is
not certain that the actual event has been "caused." 81 When we say
that "causation" is clear in a case of an actual future contingency,
what we mean is that the causal source of the event is known, if the
event does in fact occur. Calculation of damages for actual future
contingencies, assuming that their causal source is clear, is done by
calculating the likely loss from the event if it occurs and
discounting this figure to reflect the possibility that it may not
occur.
The effect of an award of provisional damages paired with a
reassessment of damages after a contingent future deterioration has
occurred is to transform an actual future contingency into a past
known event by delaying assessment until after the deterioration
occurs. Since the deterioration is a past known event at the time of
the reassessment, damages for the deterioration should be
calculated using the same principles used in a trial for calculating
damages for past known events. There may be some issue of
causation if there is more than one alleged cause of the
deterioration, but this should be dealt with using the but/for test to
identify necessary causes on a balance of probabilities. There is no
longer an issue of certainty with respect to speculation as the event
has already occurred.
Past known events and actual future contingencies should be
differentiated from "loss of chance" cases. These first two
categories of events are not "loss of chance" cases because those
cases involve known or knowable events, as opposed to "loss of
chance" cases, which are concerned with past hypothetical events
whose outcomes are unknowable. Damages are awarded in "loss of
chance" cases to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of an
opportunity to take certain actions at all caused by the conduct of
the defendant. It is submitted that the situation of a physical injury
that may worsen in the future is in no way a "loss of chance" case, as
it deals with an actual future contingency (whose outcome is
knowable) as opposed to a past hypothetical event (whose outcome
is unknowable). In most "loss of chance" cases, the causal source of
the potential loss is clear and the issue is really whether the known
81

What has been caused is a risk that the future contingent event may occur.
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cause actually resulted in any damage (quantum). 82 The real
question there is whether the loss of a chance to participate in an
activity is worth anything, not whose fault the loss of a chance is. 83
All causation issues aside, it can be said in conclusion that given
that the principal purpose of a tort award is the compensation of the
plaintiff, a system of provisional damages presents a significant
improvement over an once-and-for-all lump sum award in that it
provides much better compensation. This improvement becomes
even more significant in light of the fact that damage awards for
personal injury are becoming larger, and presumably the errors in
compensation that can be eliminated through the use of provisional
damage awards are also becoming proportionally larger.
An incidental benefit of more accurate compensation is the
reduction of psychological stress for the plaintiff. Fleming notes the
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See M. Lunney, "What price a chance?" (1995) 15:1 Legal Studies 1.
In Lawson v. Laferriere (1991), 78 D.L.R. (4th) 609, the Supreme Court of
Canada heard the civil law case of a patient who was not informed by her doctor
that she had cancer and who subsequently died of that cancer. It was not certain
whether any treatment she might have chosen had she been informed of this
diagnosis would have improved her chances of survival at all. The central legal issue
was whether this should be dealt with as a "loss of chance" case (the patient was
arguably deprived of the chance to try other treatment by her doctor's failure to
disclose his diagnosis) or whether it was merely a case of a past known event where
the loss was certain (the patient's death) and the issue was one of causation: whether
the doctor's failure to disclose caused the patient's death. Gonthier J., writing for a
6-1 majority, held that "[i]n such cases, classical principles of [civil law] causation
suffice ... " [at 620]. One of the major factors in this conclusion was the fact that in
most medical cases, "the chance is not suspended or crystallized as is the case in the
classical loss of chance examples; it has been realized, and the morbid scenario has
necessarily played itself out. It can and should be analyzed by means of the generally
applicable rules regarding causation." [at 656].
It is foreseeable that a reassessment of damages for personal injury following an
award of provisional damages and a subsequent deterioration might involve a
retrospective analysis of damages for a known deterioration where there are
multiple alleged causes, one of which may be action by the defendant which
prevented the plaintiff from taking some measure that might have reduced the risk
of deterioration-a convoluted causation scenario, certainly. While Lawson v.
Laferriere was a civil law appeal, it supports the proposition that even a causally
complicated reassessment of a provisional damage award following a deterioration
in a common law Canadian jurisdiction should use the same causation principles as
would be used in a trial for an injury which has previously manifested itself. The
same reasoning applies as applied in that case: since the loss is actual and has
manifested itself, the normal causation principles should apply.
83
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real possibility of accident neurosis, "a largely uncontrollable
anxiety state of the victim pending adjudication of his claims."84 A
plaintiff who may develop a condition in the future but has only
been awarded a proportion of the total loss it may cause, can be
subject to considerable anxiety about whether the event will occur,
leaving her with an uncompensated expense. A plaintiff who has as
yet received no amount for a future event, but a right to ask for
further damages if it does occur, has less reason to feel anxious
about the future.

2. Early Disposition of Claim
In general, a claim for provisional damages can be disposed of more
quickly than a comparable lump sum claim. The actual proceeding
itself is made much more compact by the assumption that certain
future contingencies will not occur. Provisional damages allow an
earlier, shorter trial, as "[a] lot of detailed speculative evidence and
argument about the future is unnecessary." 85
Proceedings for provisional damages also give parties less reason to
delay to see if a medical condition will change. Fleming states this
as a disadvantage of the lump-sum award:
... by tempting one or the other party to postpone the
final and irrevocable assessment as far as possible in the
hope of a development favourable to him, it encourages
delay with its whole galaxy of attendant ills, ranging
from clogging of court lists, legal chicanery, and waning
mental recall by witnesses, to the denial in the meantime
of any compensation whatever to the needy victim. 86

The Holland Report also noted this phenomenon:
The argument is that a once-and-for-all system of lumpsum damage assessment compels the plaintiff to delay
the trial as long as possible in order to gather the best
possible evidence of the long term effects of his injury. If
the plaintiff knew that the assessment could be re-opened

84

Fleming, supra note 3 at 309.
Samuels, supra note 46 at 187.
86 Fleming, supra note 3 at 303-4. Fleming points out that the courts have long
been aware of this phenomenon. See Fitter v. Beal, supra note 29: "It is the
plaintiff's fault, for ifhe had not been so hasty, he might have been satisfied for this
loss of the skull also."
85
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if unexpected complications ensued, he would have no
incentive to delay . . . . " 87

Reduction in the length of trial and delay prior to trial will also
reduce litigation costs for the parties, as well as reduce court costs
and the demand for court time. However, these savings may be
largely mitigated, or even outweighed, by the litigation costs and
court use involved in the claims for later reassessment that the
plaintiff receives the right to make in awards for provisional
damages. 88

3. Efficient Economic Allocation of Risk
An economic analysis of tort law suggests that a tort system can
contribute to an efficient use of resources in a society by allocating
the cost of preventing an accident to the party who can avoid it
most cheaply (where the person suffering the loss and the person
who can avoid it most cheaply are different). 89 This assumes that
the true cost of the accident is transferred to the most efficient
cost-avoider. A system of provisional damages provides a more
accurate allocation of the actual cost of an accident than a
speculative lump-sum award made in the same circumstances
would provide. Therefore, provisional damages will operate to help
a more efficient use of resources than a lump-sum award would in
the same circumstances.
The economic advantage of provisional damages in improving
the accuracy of cost allocation in the tort system would be
mitigated if accompanied by an increase in transaction costs
through a need for increased litigation. As discussed above,
provisional damage awards allow for a shorter initial proceeding but
will sometimes require a second proceeding whose additional
length may or may not outweigh the benefit in reduced litigation
from a shorter initial proceeding. It is unclear on the whole whether
provisional damages awards would involve transaction costs greater
than lump-sum awards in similar circumstances.
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Ontario, Special Committee on Tort Compensation, Report (Toronto, 1980)
(Chair: Hon. Justice R.E. Holland) at 5 [hereinafter Holland Report].
ss See Part IX, section 2, on increased costs, infta.
89 R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1992) at 519-522.; see also chapters 6 and 19.
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4. Choice for the Plaintiff
Legislation authorizing provisional damages can be drafted to give
the plaintiff the choice of whether a lump sum or provisional
damages are better for her. An award of provisional damages and
potential reassessment can, on the whole, give the plaintiff more or
less compensation relative to a lump sum award depending on the
circumstances. The difference lies essentially in the magnitude of
the possibility of future deterioration in a given case. A system of
provisional damages that must be specifically pleaded by the
plaintiff will allow her to assess the relative benefits and risks of the
alternative methods of damage assessment and to choose the
method which best suits the circumstances and her tolerance for
risk. (The choice by the plaintiff will not be determinative of the
method used, as the award will likely be discretionary.)
If we accept that the compensation of the plaintiff is the main
goal of an award of damages and that plaintiffs are good judges of
what is best for them, a system which gives a plaintiff a choice
between methods of calculating that compensation provides an
advantage over one which does not.

5. Only an Incremental Change
As a relatively minor reform to the procedure of damage awards, a
system of provisional damages is easier to introduce than a more
fundamental change. Academic lawyers and government
commissions in Canada have written extensively on the deficiencies
of the lump-sum system of damages. The solutions they have
suggested are periodic payments,9° a tort fund,9 1 or comprehensive
accident fund such as the one instituted in New Zealand.92 To date,
none of these has been introduced. Presumably, this is because the
magnitude and complexity of these reforms creates significant

90 C. Bruce, "Four Techniques for Compensating Tort Damage" (1983) 21:1
U.W.O. L. Rev. l; B. Feldthusen & K. McNair, "General Damages in Personal
Injury Suits" (1978) 28 U.T.L.J. 381; Manitoba, Law Reform Commission, Report
on Periodic Payment ofDamages for Personal Injury and Death (Law Com. No. 68)
(Winnipeg, 1987).
91 Bale, supra note 3.
92 See G. Palmer, "New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenry
Years On" (1994) 44 U.T.L.J. 223; J. F. Keeler, "Social Insurance, Disability and
Personal Injury: A Retrospective View" (1994) 44 U.T.L.J. 275.
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legislative inertia, which prevents bills implementing them from
being passed. These reforms are comprehensive enough that they
require legislation by the provinces. If any related tax provisions are
required, Parliament must also be convinced of the need for
reform. However, there has been insufficient political will to this
point in time to get this legislation passed.
A system of provisional damages is much less comprehensive
than these reforms and will encounter far less legislative inertia or
resistance from the legal profession in order to be enacted. The
legislation required to enact the change in Britain fits on a single
page or two, and the supporting Rules of Court are not much
longer. (On the issue of whether the change will require legislation
in Canadian jurisdictions will require legislation, see Introducing
the Reform in Canada, below.) Rather than replace the present
lump-sum tort system entirely, a system of provisional damages
provides a new choice of how certain personal injury damages may
be calculated. It does not abrogate the "once-and-for-all" rule
entirely; it merely provides a specific statutory exception. The
exception applies only to general damages and only applies to loss
of income where it is caused by a subsequent deterioration. The
basic theory of loss of earning potential as a capital asset is
unchanged; only the time for assessment of this asset is different.
For all these reasons, a system of provisional damages presents an
alternative to lump sum awards that can realistically be introduced
in the relatively near future.
IX. DISADVANTAGES OF REFORM

1. Lack of Finality
An award of provisional damages, with its accompanying right for
the plaintiff to apply for further damages based on a future
contingency, does not provide finality for the defendant. There is
considerable value for the defendant in being able to "close the
books" on a lawsuit. A lump sum allows "the defendant (usually an
insurer) [to] close the file and accurately assess all costs. Premiums
can be adjusted and policy cover altered if necessary such decision
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informing the public of the true costs of risk-spreading." 93 The
Manitoba Law Reform Commission argues that:
The possibility of review would make estimating the full
extent of liability and calculating appropriate premiums
and reserves extremely difficult. Inevitably, insurers' costs
would rise and liability insurance premiums would
increase. 94

The possibility that the plaintiff might apply for further damages
creates a lingering uncertainty for the defendant. Fairness to the
defendant should be considered. A lump-sum award, in contrast,
allows the defendant to dispose of the claim once and for all.
A lack of finality also has disadvantages for the plaintiff. For
her, there remains the uncertainty that her condition might
deteriorate, but she might not be successful in a reassessment of
damages, either for a lack of funds to initiate litigation, or for an
inability to meet the standard of proof. New medical knowledge
that did not exist at the time of the original award might challenge
the notion that a given subsequent deterioration was actually caused
by the wrongful conduct of the defendant. There is a significant
risk that the defendant may be insolvent and unable to pay a
further award of damages.95 A lump-sum award gives the plaintiff
her compensation all at once; none of it is left to the uncertain
future. The plaintiff can devote all her energies to rehabilitation.96 A
further application for damages also subjects the plaintiff to the
psychological stress of a second proceeding.
Other negative effects coming from the delay between
proceedings are possible, but not as certain. There may be an
incentive for the defendant to engage in surveillance of the plaintiff
after the initial award of provisional damages to ensure the plaintiff
is not failing to take measures to recover from her injury in the hope
that some deterioration will lead to more money on reassessment.
This incentive may exist to some degree but it is mitigated where,
as in the British system, reassessment is limited to a marked and

U.K., Law Commission, supra note 57 at 4.
Manitoba, Law Reform Commission, supra note 90 at 65-6. This comment is
made in reference to reviewable periodic payments, but it is submitted that this
reasoning applies to provisional damages, as well.
95 U.K., Law Commission, supra note 57 at 4.
93
94

96

Ibid
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substantial deterioration and not a gradual one. It is also mitigated
by the fact that additional damages awarded in a reassessment are
only supposed to compensate for increased expenses resulting from
any deterioration-hardly a net windfall for the plaintiff. In light of
these mitigating factors, it seems that plaintiffs who would be
willing to "let themselves go" in the hope of suffering substantial
deterioration to have their damages reassessed are likely rare.
Further, this motivation is not necessarily worse than it is for a
comparable lump-sum personal injury award. In a lump-sum award,
plaintiffs also have an incentive to delay or neglect rehabilitation up
to the time of trial so that they might be able to prove more serious
InJunes and ensure a larger award of damages for themselves at
trial.
2. Increased Costs

Any application for a reassessment following an award of
provisional damages involves additional litigation costs for all the
parties. An application involving substantial expert medical evidence
regarding the extent and causation of any deterioration will create
significant costs. The plaintiff will incur this cost without any
guarantee of an additional award. Such costs are not necessary
where damages have been awarded once and for all in a lump sum
in a single proceeding.
Applications for further damages create significant public costs
and administrative inconvenience by increasing the burden on the
courts. A second proceeding adds to an already overcrowded court
docket. As mentioned above, expert medical evidence is not only
expensive for the parties, it requires a significant amount of time in
court. This is a significant additional public expense which will not
occur where the initial claim is for a conventional lump sum with no
right to a further award.
The amount of additional evidence required in the reassessment
proceeding can be substantial, as the issue of causation may not be
entirely disposed of in the initial award. This is the case even in the
British system where reassessment is limited to deterioration
specified at the time of trial. As discussed above, even where the
specified deterioration can be proved by the plaintiff, it appears to
still be open to the defendant to argue that the deterioration was
not caused by the fault of the defendant, but by an independent,
intervening cause. If such an argument were sufficiently grounded
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in fact, the evidence required to settle the issue of causation alone
could be substantial. Expert medical evidence would almost always
be required in this process. As well, the issue of quantum, the
conventional domain of the reassessment proceeding, remains to be
addressed exclusive of causation. This can also require substantial
expert evidence.
The number of cases where submissions on the issue of
causation in a reassessment proceeding are necessary could
potentially be even greater in a system that allowed reassessment for
not only deterioration specified in the initial award, but rather for
any deterioration which could be shown on a balance of
probabilities to have been caused by the original injury. An
argument can be made based on the compensation principle that
reassessment should be available on this broader basis. The limit on
reassessment in the British system to only cases where the specified
deterioration occurs does not appear to be based in theory, but is
most likely a practical limit designed to keep the use of
reassessment proceedings in check. The introduction of a system of
provisional damages in Canada might well want to favour
compensation and remove this limit to reassessment. If so, the
frequency, length, and complexity of reassessment proceedings will
likely increase, imposing additional public and private costs. These
increased costs must be considered in deciding the practical limits
to be placed on any system of provisional damages.
It should be noted however, that reviewable awards are quite
common in family law and seem to be handled by the courts
without the entire system grinding to a halt. Although significant
resources are allotted to family court, and the practical and
theoretical bases of the reviewable awards are quite different in
family cases than in personal injury cases, the prevalence of
reviewable awards in family law demonstrates that the practicalities
of administering reviewable awards are neither foreign to nor
completely objectionable to our courts.

3. Only Marginal Improvement
The introduction of a system of provisional damages addresses only
one of the numerous problems with speculation in lump sum
awards. Although it eliminates the need to speculate on the future
progress of the plaintiffs injuries in certain cases, this is only one of
many bases for speculation inherent in assessing lump sum damages
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for future loss. All other contingencies must still be "crudely
translated into a present value." 97 An award of provisional damages
will do nothing to help the court avoid or improve its speculation
with respect to future inflation, future interest rates, future
employment prospects, future income, or the future cost of medical
care. Nor will it decrease the possibility of dissipation of the award
by the plaintiff. And, as stated above, it applies only to general
damages and only applies to loss of income where it is caused by a
subsequent deterioration. On the whole, it may not be worth the
additional expense, inconvenience, and uncertainty of
implementing a reform whose advantages are quite narrow in terms
of the entire spectrum of speculation presently required in lump
sum awards.
It can be argued however, that aside from contingencies
concerning the plaintiffs injury, all other speculation in a lump sum
award considers factors that will change for society as a whole. The
injury of the plaintiff is something that will change, if at all, only
for her. This allows us to distinguish it from other future
contingencies on two bases: first, it gives us a more personal reason
to revisit the award (compensation of a specific plaintiff); and
second, a more personal basis for doing so (verification of her
individual situation and not of general societal economic factors). If
we are to choose only one of the many bases for speculation in
lump-sum awards to eliminate, the progress of the plaintiffs injury
is a good choice, as it delivers better individualized justice through
more accurate personal compensation.
This argument does not necessarily carry the day on the
theoretical front. If the main argument in favour of a system of
provisional damages is improving compensation to the plaintiff,
then it follows that the best compensation such a system could
provide would occur if the plaintiff were allowed to have damages
reassessed on all and any contingencies which had changed to her
detriment since the initial award of damages. The initial award will
speculate as to future contingencies like the plaintiffs personal
employment prospects, the labour market in her industry, the
discount rate, the cost of future care, etc. There is still a compelling
argument based on the compensation principle that the plaintiff
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D. Harris, Remedies in Contract and Tort (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1988) at 276.
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should be able to see her damages reassessed with respect to all
speculation which turns out later to have made the initial award
smaller than it would have been had information which later
became available been available at the time of the initial trial.
The best reason not to allow such a broad reassessment of
damages is practicality. If plaintiffs who were granted awards of
provisional damages were allowed to apply for reassessment based
on any change in societal contingencies that disadvantaged them,
every personal injury plaintiff would apply for provisional damages,
as it is always foreseeable that the discount rate might decrease or
the labour market in a particular industry might improve. No
reasonable plaintiff would want to miss out on the right to hedge
their damage award against the occurrence of this sort of
unforeseen circumstances. The frequency of applications for
provisional damages would be extremely high and the original
purpose of the system, to provide better compensation for injured
plaintiffs whose injuries may deteriorate, would be lost in a sea of
motions. This outcome is undesirable and avoiding it provides
good justification for limiting the basis of reassessment to
deterioration of the plaintiff's medical condition caused by the
original injuty.

4. Reassessment Only Benefits the Plaintiff
Reassessment of an award of provisional damages can be seen as
unfair, as it is a one-way reassessment: additional damages can be
awarded, but the initial award cannot be reduced. This unfairness
criticism can be made in those cases where an injury or condition
exists at the time of trial and the future contingency is not whether
it might deteriorate, but rather whether it might improve. A system
which only allows reassessment initiated by the plaintiff allows for
her to apply for more damages in the case of deterioration, but
does not allow the defendant to apply for a reduction in the case of
an improvement. 98 This contradiction cannot be reconciled on a
theoretical level.

9 8 A similar situation arises where the initial award for a severely disabled
plaintiff includes a large sum for the cost of future care, and the plaintiff dies soon
thereafter, creating a windfall for her estate. The defendant cannot apply for a
partial repayment here, either.
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There are however, a number of practical reasons to bar the
defendant from applying for a reduction of provisional damages.
The U.K. Law Commission argues that this would be undesirable, as
the plaintiff may not be in a position to repay part of the initial
award. 99 If, as in most cases, the defendant is an insurer, it will be
able to pool the extra cost of what turns out to be
overcompensation for the plaintiff with all the other similar risks it
insures. The plaintiff, in contrast, is an individual and would have to
bear the cost of any subsequent repayment personally. 10 ° Fleming
argues that the possibility of reduction in an award would not only
increase the likelihood of accident neurosis in the plaintiff, it would
also give the defendant (insurer) an incentive to spy on the plaintiff
if it suspected her of faking an injury or condition. 101 The Holland
Report also argued that "[i]f it will pay the defendant to prove that
the plaintiff is less disabled than he claims or that he is earning
more than he admits, it may pay the defendant also to investigate
the plaintiffs affairs in search of evidence." 102 The invasion of
privacy that such a practice would entail is undesirable, particularly
in light of the fact that the plaintiff may already be under
emotional strain from her injuries.
5. Problematic Interaction with Other Statutes

The British model recommended by this paper has created the
possibility that an initial award of provisional damages may
preclude the estate or the dependents of a plaintiff who later dies
from the injuries specified in the award from claiming damages for
loss of income for the "lost years": the time the plaintiff would have
lived, but for the injury. Canadian statutes providing a right of
recovery for dependents in fatal accidents, 103 or those which allow
the estate of the deceased to make a claim, 104 may not provide such
rights where the injuries in question have been the subject of a
previously determined claim. A great deal turns on whether the

Law Commission, supra note 63 at 97.
Ironically, it might be possible for the plaintiff to purchase some insurance to
cover this eventuality.
101 Fleming, supra note 3 at 309.
102 Holland Report, supra note 87 at 12-13.
l03 E.g. Fatal!njuries Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 163.
99 u.K.,
100

l04

E.g. Survival ofActions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 453.
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initial award of provisional damages-which assumes that the
fatality (the ultimate deterioration) would not occur-is considered
a previously determined claim. Given that the assumption in the
initial award works to exclude future contingencies from the
assessment of damages, compensation for the lost years can slip
through the cracks. To date, the law remains uncertain in Britain on
this issue. The u.K. Law Commission has recommended statutory
reform and it appears that a minor amendment will remedy the
problem.
The applicable statutes in Nova Scotia, the Fatal Injuries Act10 5
and the Survival ofActions Act, 106 in their present form would not
appear to disallow a claim for the "lost years" under a system of
provisional damages where the injury which gave rise to the initial
award eventually resulted in the death of the plaintiff and the
deterioration in question was a permissible basis for reassessment.
However, any jurisdiction intending to implement this reform
should consider carefully how the proposed legislation might affect
other related claims and endeavour to prevent any undesirable
ambiguities.
6. Problematic Interaction with Insurance Systems
It is not entirely clear how a system of provisional damages with
possible subsequent reassessment would interact with a combined
tort-insurance system, such as a no-fault or workers' compensation
system, where certain personal injury actions are statute-barred.
This ambiguity is entirely dependent on the particular nature of
legislation in a given jurisdiction, but it has the potential to be
problematic in the implementation of a system of provisional
damages.
One suggestion that would appear to eliminate most cases of
ambiguity is drafting and interpretation of legislation authorizing
awards of provisional damages such that it does not create rights to
either an initial award of damages or a reassessment in cases where
an ordinary lump-sum award is precluded by statute. Any system
of provisional damages should only allow awards in cases where an
action is otherwise allowed. It should be seen as creating an

105
106

R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 163, s. 3.
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 453, s. 2.
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additional option for the awarding of damages by judges in
appropriate circumstances and where tort claims for lump-sum
awards would be allowed, and not as creating any wholly original
causes of action or rights of recovery.

X. WEIGHING THE ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES

On the whole, a reform which allows provisional damage awards for
personal injury will further the main goal of damage awards by
allowing more accurate compensation of the plaintiff whose injuries
may or may not deteriorate in the future. It will also allow for
earlier compensation of the plaintiff who applies for provisional
damages than would otherwise occur with a lump-sum award. The
use of these awards will certainly create a lack finality in certain
cases and will impose increased court costs and administrative
inconvenience in others. However, the lack of finality will not occur
generally, but only in those cases where an award of provisional
damages is granted. Similarly, the increased administrative costs of
a further application for damages will not be incurred in every case
where such an award is granted. They will only be incurred in the
subset of such cases where the specified deterioration actually
occurs and the plaintiff brings an application for further damages.
Thus, the disadvantages of such a system are reasonably limited.
It is submitted that while the increased cost of introducing a
system of provisional damages may be substantial, it is unlikely to
outweigh the considerable improvement in compensation for the
plaintiff, both in the amount of damages and the time in which
damages can be obtained. If we are genuine in our claim that
compensation for the plaintiff is our main concern, then the
introduction of provisional damages to our courts is worthwhile.

XI. INTRODUCING THE REFORM IN CANADA
It is submitted that a system of provisional damage awards such as
has been introduced in Britain can and should be introduced in
Canadian common law jurisdictions. This will be a relatively simple
change. Since our court structure is modelled on the British court
system, it is possible to adopt such a system using the same
structure it has used: amendments to the Rules of Court.
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The u.K. Parliament passed a specific statutory amendment
authorizing new provisional damages rules. A statutory amendment
may or may not be necessary to authorize such a system in
Canadian jurisdictions, depending on the breadth of the statutory
authorization in the main court statute to make rules generally. For
example, in Nova Scotia, section 46 of the judicature Act provides:
46 The judges of the Court of Appeal or a majority of
them may make rules of court in respect of the Court of
Appeal and the judges of the Supreme Court or a
majority of them may make rules of court in respect of
the Supreme Court for carrying this Act into effect and,
in particular, ...
(b) regulating the pleading, practice and procedure in the
Court and the rules of law which are to prevail in relation
to remedies in proceedings therein, ...
(e) prescribing and regulating the proceedings under any
enactment that confers jurisdiction upon the Court or a
judge; ...
(i) regulating the means by which particular facts may be
proved and the mode in which evidence thereof may be
given in any proceeding or on any application m
connection with or at any stage of any proceeding;

(j) generally for regulating any matter relating to the
practice and procedure of the Court, or to the duties of
the officers thereof, or to the costs of proceedings therein
and every other matter deemed expedient for better
attaining the ends of justice, advancing the remedies of
suitors and carrying into effect the provisions of this Act,
and of all other statutes in force respecting the Court. 107

New rules allowing application for awards of provisional damages
and subsequent reassessment proceedings would probably all fall
under one or more of these provisions. An exception to the "once
and for all" rule of damage assessment could be made under
section 46(b) ("rules of law .
in relation to remedies in
proceedings"), a rule allowing the presumption that specified
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R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240, s.46.
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deterioration would not take place could be made under section
46(i) ("the means by which particular facts may be proved"), and
other aspects of the required amendments to the rules could likely
be made generally under section 46(j).
However, it is probably more appropriate to establish a system
of provisional damages through a statutory amendment to the main
court statute in a given jurisdiction (e.g. the judicature Act, in Nova
Scotia). This allows political debate in the provincial legislature over
this reform before it is passed. This is appropriate given the
substantial fiscal and legal effects that a system of provisional
damages would have for the courts, the public, and the insurance
industry. On the other hand, if it is seen that there is significant
legislative inertia preventing an amendment to the governing court
statute and a rapid introduction is desirable, it does not appear that
there is anything preventing the introduction of provision damages
through the Rules of Court alone.
It is submitted that the substantive provisions of the u. K.
Supreme Court Rules which govern provisional damages and the
Rules of Court that regulate their use should and can be copied in
Canadian jurisdictions. The British reform seems to work
effectively, except for a few ambiguities which have mostly been
corrected since 1985. Any adoption of this system in Canada
should certainly include modifications to eliminate these
ambiguities. Specifically, they are: the standard of possibility of
future deterioration required to qualify for provisional damages ("a
chance"), the standard of future deterioration required to qualify
for provisional damages ("serious deterioration" meaning clear and
severable or unexpected deterioration versus normal progressive
deterioration), whether successive applications for further damages
based on the same specified condition or deterioration arising on
more than one part of the plaintiffs body and how an award of
provisional damages should, if at all, affect claims and/ or damages
under fatal injuries or survival of actions acts should the plaintiff die
from the condition or disease specified in the award.
Introducing a system of provisional damage awards in
Canadian jurisdictions would allow the courts better compensation
for certain victims of personal injury who might otherwise find
themselves substantially under compensated when an injury
resulting from the fault of someone else deteriorates. Although this
will result in an increase in court use and potentially in overall
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litigation costs for the parties, there are a number of parameters
involved in the drafting of provisions and rules authorizing such
awards which allow considerable control over the balance that is
achieved between increased compensation and control of public and
private costs and disadvantages. On the whole, if we accept that
compensation is the prime value underlying the tort system, it is
desirable to introduce a system of awards provisional damages and
accompanying rights of reassessment in personal injury claims.

